Concepts of Existentialism
The existential concepts evident in the synthesis of the ideologies of both Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus are freedom and transcendence, which bear divergent and convergent perspectives varied according to the authors’ views (Camus 12). The understanding of the concepts of existentialism emanates from the ground that human beings are rooted in a void nature without any meaning which forms their origin. The origin ideally forms the basis of the subjection to the existential concepts, where the views of Sartre clearly condemn human beings to freedom as an existential concept. This shows that Sartre is a champion in expressing the need for freedom in every human aspect since the origin of human existence does not bear any inherent identity. Nonetheless, Albert Camus is also an advocate of human freedom as an existentialist concept. The synthesis of his ideology applied to the treatment of slave camps represents the emblem of freedom. As the consequence, the acceleration of the forces of human beings in confrontation with the world represents a form of the coinage of absurdity (Camus 23).
Consequently, absurdity is defined as the efforts of human beings to counteract the forces of confrontation of nature, leads to a consequent confrontation with transcendence as a concept of existentialism, which is defined as the extent to which human beings are understood as the ones that are concerned about the search for the values of possibilities as opposed to the conventional understanding of the ones as detached elements from alternate courses of action. On the contrary, Camus viewed these ideologies of transcendence as being deceptive, where he was the icon of criticism to the philosophies of both external and historical transcendence, bearing the examples of Christianity and Marxism respectively. This shows that Camus was not an advocate of the concepts of transcendence which he considered as being absolute. The general correlation of the concepts of existentialism depicted by both freedom and transcendence as elucidated by both Camus and Sartre forms the basis of this paper.
In the synthesis of freedom as a concept of existentialism, both Camus and Sartre converge in the thought of subjection of a man to freedom as condemnation rather than a virtue, taking into consideration the definition of freedom as condemnation rather than a right to human nature. The nature of freedom exercised to human beings emanates from the definition of the origin of human existence, which is depicted as being inherently void. This implies that human beings came into existence without any form of attachment. Moreover, the freedom accorded to human beings is unique. According to the ideologies of the authors, freedom lies in one’s perception that there is no freedom (Beauvoir 52).
This is a synthesis of the belief that once humans are freed from believing that there exists no freedom, what implies that they are free, while the converse is also true to such an extent that once one’s convictions are not freed from the belief that they are free, they would be the victims of the bondage of their own minds. This has a related impact on the conscience of a person, where one might act in rebellion, which is also a source of absurdity. This implies that freedom is a concept with a common entity of understanding to most existentialists, where they view freedom as essentiality, which is addressed from a unique entity of human beings in the universe based on the nature of formation where human beings come into existence as single entities. This is comparable to freedom in itself since appeared as a single and unique entity in the universe, human beings are already free.
Nevertheless, the doctrines of human freedom differ between the understanding of freedom evident in the ideologies of Sartre on one hand, and that of Marcus on the other. As much as Sartre tries to define absolute freedom as the contravention from the popular freedom that gives man the platform for choice of what they need to do, which is rather based on the situation, Camus on his part views the doctrines of freedom as being based on the lack of the human nature, which is essentially freedom from casual determination. This elucidates the argument that as much as Sartre negates the conventional sources of freedom that gave human beings the ability to decide what to do, he implies that the freedom should be based on a regulatory form of a grant, which is a contravention of the argument of Camus that the freedom should be born out of determination, which is evidently choice of what best suits the conscience of the mind. As much as Sartre restrains human beings from the freedom of self-judgment, of the environment, he constrains the human mind to freedom that is bound within the situation and that is more of an intention based on the best morals and behavior (Fannon 63).
The contravention in this belief of situational freedom lies in the reasoning of Camus, whose doctrine of freedom is based on determination, which gives human beings the freedom to exercise freedom according to competence since the natural root of human nature is void. This also implies that as much as Camus is an advocate of exercising full freedom as evidently based on the determination, Sartre provides restrictions to the rules of exercising the kind of freedom as to the extent that it should not supersede what one does at will, but freedom bound to the situation.
On the other hand, Camus’ consideration of criticism for both vertical and horizontal transcendence doctrines, as being absolute elucidates varied forms of controversies with the ideologies of transcendence as considered by Sartre. In real essence, Marcus despised the doctrines of transcendence as being deceptive and rather gave preferences to the Mediterranean humanism based on the moderation of nature than the conventional historicism, while Sartre had a notion of consideration of stoicism as lacking the roots since the participants of rebellion lies entirely in the successes entitled to them and not in the endurance. This shows that Marcus could criticize Christianity and Marxism as the doctrines of both eternal and historical transcendence. They were categorically epitomized by the lack of human nature (Fannon 27).
However, these notions could not collude with the understanding of Sartre, whose views of criticism to the doctrines of transcendence bearing in mind that his philosophical understanding of the doctrines were based on Marxism and Christianity as factors underpinning natural existence and the consequent human nature. This insinuates an argument on whether the consideration of the doctrines of transcendence as being the absolute was valid. In reaction to this perspective, Jean Sartre is a source of destruction of the lies tied to the favors afore given to Mediterranean humanism by Marcus, where he gives the human race the advocacy to historicism and violence as opposed to the advocacy of nature and moderation. The latter is also a synthesis of Marcus, who gave the general preference to nature and moderation as opposed to conventional historicism and violence. This also forms the aspect of the ground formation of the criticism to the doctrines of transcendence validated by Marcus, and whose facts do not concur with the conceptualization of the ideologies by Sartre (Sartre 48).
The aspect that brings out convergence in the ideologies of transcendence lies in art wherein nature, the description of subsidy as the source of the concepts of existentialism could elude transcendence as a coinage of finding hope through the supernatural deity. In this aspect, Camus praises the discovery made by Sartre on the causes of Absurdity and the consequences therein, where human beings are in a constant confrontation with the structures imposed on their existence. The synthesis of the argument of convergence with the transcendence evident in the ideologies of both Camus and Sartre lies in the fact that both authors are in contentment with the notion that the values of men change with the absurdity of life, where values might be washed away due to the processes that happen in the natural environment. In comparison, these values are dynamic just like beauty created out of art, which is also found under some process of formation. These changes are occurring arguably due to the supernatural forces that happen with the aid of the supernatural Deity (Beauvoir 53).
This also shows that the existence of absurdity in human nature is consequently a changing process. This elucidates the argument of dynamicity in the doctrines of transcendence, which are apprehended by both authors in the form of depicting the best-sounding art as a force of changing the dynamic world. The best formation of understanding the aspect of transcendence lies in the passage of historical events and current happenings, which bring about the necessary changes. This also gives the best definition of contentment of the ideologies of both Camus and Sartre about the transitions evident in the natural world and the forces underpinning these changes. Such an understanding is vital in the conclusion that civilization is the fruit of upholding beauty through practicing the elements of art as a continuation of creation that started from the world of unknown human nature.